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1.  Introduction 
 
In spite of the fact that for developing economies the idea of an ‘explicit’ inflation 
targeting (IT) framework generates several caveats (See Masson, Savastano, and 
Sharma, 1997) 
1
, in practice the central banks of such countries generally aim at 
preserving price stability, chiefly because they are mandated to do so legally. Therefore, 
it would be interesting to determine empirically whether or not central banks in such 
economies behave as if they were following an ‘implicit’ IT monetary policy strategy. 
For instance, can a nominal monetary policy feedback rule (NFR) that embodies an 
inflation targeting mechanism approximate historical monetary policy behaviour in a 
                                               
1
 These provisos are mainly related to the institutional conditions that should ‘ideally’ 
be met before a central bank explicitly adopts an inflation targeting monetary policy 
framework. 
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developing economy context? This paper will attempt to provide evidence on this idea 
by investigating the Dominican Republic (DR). 
 Several questions, which are not only relevant for the DR but for similar 
economies as well, can be addressed through this methodology. For instance, (a) what is 
the link between the indicators and targets of the monetary authorities? (b) Is there 
evidence that the central bank has ‘implicitly’ targeted inflation? (c) What role (if any) 
have other key variables, such as the exchange rate, played in the monetary authorities’ 
historical behaviour? 
In addition to the above arguments, in this context its is worth quoting Mishkin 
and Savastano (2000, p.3) "Issues central to the understanding of monetary policy such 
as the nature and duration of the lags from instruments to targets, the main transmission 
mechanism of monetary impulses, and the identification of monetary policy shocks are 
largely absent from the Latin America debate, and for a number of countries studies of 
those issues do not even exist."  
It is worth emphasising that the paper’s objective is not to substantiate the 
existence of a formal IT strategy in the DR, with all its implications, as described by, for 
example, Mishkin (2000). A priori we know it is not the case. The basic intuition behind 
the proposed framework is that shifts in an indicator of monetary policy should be 
associated with the developments over time in the (implicit) targets of a central bank’s 
authorities, i.e. a positive, rather than a normative, exercise. 
The analysis developed in this investigation is based on a mechanism that 
considers the behaviour of the monetary authorities only incorporating nominal 
variables. Therefore, this 'indicator model' approach is expected to shed light on the 
approximate intentions of the CBDR, rather than on their exact policymaking 
 3 
procedures, as reflected through variations of an intended inflation indicator with 
respect to key macroeconomic variables. In other words, the paper deals with an 
operational issue. 
Finally, it is worthy of note at the outset that the level of inflation in the DR has 
been historically mild, averaging 13.50% per annum during the period to be considered 
below. This last fact is important given that the proposed analysis would be more 
difficult to motivate in the context of a high and variable rate of inflation.  
What remains of the investigation is organised as follows. Section 2 elucidates 
the economic intuition behind the nominal feedback rule (NFR) to be employed. Section 
3 describes the data set at hand, and rationalises the econometric specification opted for. 
The outcomes of the empirical modelling are evaluated in section 4. Section 5 conveys 
final remarks on the paper's findings. 
 
 
2. A nominal monetary policy indicator model for the Dominican Republic 
 
In formulating a suitable a nominal monetary policy feedback rule (NFR) for the DR the 
research considers a ‘generic’ mechanism of the form 
 
tttt
yyyzz )()( *110    .       (1) 
 
In equation (1), which expresses all the variables in logs, z is a policy instrument or 
intermediate target assumed to be controllable by the monetary authorities; y and *y are 
the hypothesised nominal target and its reference value, respectively; 0 is the baseline 
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rate of growth of the nominal target; 
1 is a feedback parameter which indicates how 
swiftly the monetary authorities respond to gaps between the actual and desired levels 
of the nominal target variable; and 
1
)(


tt
yz  is a forecast of the relationship 
amongst the nominal target and the instrument. Throughout the paper  denotes the 
difference operator. 
In a particular application of a NFR like (1), Duecker and Fisher (1996) 
incorporate open economy features to analyse Switzerland’s monetary policy. 
Specifically, the authors allow for the possibility of central bank reactions to the 
nominal exchange rate. An analogous specification would also seem to be appropriate 
for the analysis of the DR’s monetary policy2. Although the CBDR has, by law, several 
mandates, one of its objectives is to preserve internal price stability. Specifically, the 
cardinal goals of the CBDR are to promote and maintain monetary, exchange rate, and 
credit conditions that help sustain the purchasing power of the Dominican Peso (DR$), 
internal price stability, and economic growth 
3
.  
Additionally, in the light of the fact that the DR has for a long time had a 
multiple exchange rate regime
4
, some sort of exchange rate indicator should be one of 
the (implicit) targets considered in a hypothetical NFR. In the light of the above 
arguments, the feedback equation to be analysed for the DR is  
                                               
2
 A major advantage of a NFR is that it does not depend on real aggregate economic 
activity variables. Such variables, notably for the case of developing economies, are 
sometimes not available at relatively high (quarterly or monthly) frequencies, and/or are 
wrongly measured. 
3
 See the CBDR’s website (http://www.bancentral.gov.do/) for further particulars. 
4
 The system is composed of the official, banking system, and extra-banking system 
(parallel-black) exchange rate markets. Additionally, at the moment around 15% of the 
total volume of foreign exchange transactions are subject to CBDR surrender 
requirements, the rest are handled through the private (banking plus parallel) market. 
Throughout, the paper refers to the exchange rate of Dominican Republic Pesos (DR$) 
per United States Dollars (US$), since the US is by far the DR’s main trading partner. 
 5 
 
*
0 1 1 2 11
( ) ( ) ( ) .m ot t tt tm m p e e                 (2) 
 
In (2) tm  is the rate of change of a nominal monetary aggregate assumed to be an 
intermediate target manipulated by the central bank (See B. Friedman, 1990); 
1
)(


tt
pm  is a forecast of the real demand for the monetary aggregate in question, 
included to infer the ‘intended’ inflation rate of the monetary authorities; * 1( )t    and 
1( )
m o
te e  are the inflation gap (e.g. Svensson, 1997) and the black market and the 
official exchange rates differential, respectively, where  , * , me and Oe are the actual 
and target inflation rates, and the market and official exchange rates, respectively
5
. 
Additionally, in (2) ,, 10  and 2 are coefficients to be estimated empirically. 
The behaviour of the feedback coefficients 1  and 2  is crucial, given that they indicate 
how quickly inflation and exchange rate gaps are dealt with by the monetary authorities. 
Remarkably, the reader should perceive that when both such gaps are closed the model 
amounts to a period by period targeting of the long run inflation rate 0 .  
The use of a monetary aggregate as a monetary policy indicator in (2) deserves 
to be highlighted. Such a decision arises mainly due to the fact that monetary policy 
instruments frequently employed in developed countries, e.g. interest rates (Bernanke 
and Blinder, 1992), are less likely to be implemented in developing economies, given 
their unique transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Montiel, 1991). For instance, 
                                               
5
 Note that )( *  is a growth-rate target, which for an economy like the DR seems to 
be more appealing than a growing-levels target, e.g. )( *pp  ; * and *p are reference 
values of the inflation rate and the price level, respectively. See McCallum (1999) for a 
discussion on growth-rate versus growing-levels targets. 
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in the DR ceilings were imposed on market interest rates until the beginning of the 
1990s
6
.  
It is worth emphasising that the crucial target in (2) is (e
m
 – eo), a differential the 
authorities would want to keep as small as possible. The larger is (e
m
 – eo) the higher is 
the probability of a collapse of the official exchange rate regime; 
2  0 would be 
observed if the authorities are willing to defend the official rate from bubbles, 
speculative attacks, or other non-real factors
7
. Such an outcome could be generated 
mainly by depletion of foreign reserves (e.g. Lizondo, 1987; Sarno and Taylor, 2001), 
but could also be paired with a reduction in domestic credit (i.e. a contraction of the 
monetary base), in order to reduce liquidity
8
. However, under adverse, real, 
circumstances, it is difficult (if not impossible) to keep indefinitely an overvalued 
currency (See Garber and Svensson, 1995). 
 
                                               
6
 Young et al (2001) provide a concise description of financial repression in the DR, 
which was considerable until the wide-ranging economic reforms undertaken at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Note, however, that even after the above mentioned 
liberalisation process the financial underdevelopment of the DR, the oligopolistic 
structure of its commercial banking system, and the (probably) limited credibility of the 
monetary authorities with the general public thwart the effectiveness of any interest rate 
based instruments.  
7
 Therefore, (e
m
 – eo) could be seen as a criterion economic agents employ in 
determining how ‘credible’ the exchange rate system is at each point in time. 
8
 Note that a contraction in the monetary base is intuitively equivalent to an increase in 
the interest rate. 
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3. ` Data and specification 
3.1.  Data 
 
The empirical analyses to be carried out below employ a monthly data set ranging from 
1969.6 to 2000.12. The source of all the statistical information is the Central Bank of 
the Dominican Republic. Hereafter, m is the log of nominal 2M , originally expressed 
in millions of Dominican Republic Pesos (DR$)
9
. Being the broadest measure of money 
calculated for the DR, nominal 2M  appears to be a suitable candidate for the analysis
10
. 
The other variables employed in the study are the log of the consumer price index )( p , 
the log of the ‘parallel’ exchange market nominal (sell) rate ( me ), and the log of the 
‘official’ exchange market nominal (sell) rate ( oe ). Both exchange rates are expressed 
as DR$ per US$, so that an increase in e is a depreciation and a decrease an 
appreciation. Additionally, 12 ttt mmm , and 12 ttt pp , i.e. annual money 
growth and inflation rates, respectively.  
 The paper estimates the variables 
1
)(


tt
pm , and 
* . The first one is a 
technical approximation to the internal predictions a central bank is supposed to 
generate and use when designing its policy, while the second stands as a proxy for the 
expected inflation rate
11
. In generating both variables the methodology elucidated by 
Koopman et al (2000) is put to use. Chiefly, the approach involves the estimation of a 
                                               
9
 The measure of 2M comprises money and coins in circulation, sight deposits in 
commercial banks and the central bank, and savings plus long-term deposits in 
commercial banks.  
10
 At this point it is useful to note that previous studies have provided evidence of 
money demand stability for the case of the DR, which is an important issue for the 
exercise at hand. To obtain a broad picture on the matter see Nadal De-Simone (2001), 
which models both 1M and 2M  using monthly data. 
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‘structural time series model’, from which a data sequence is generated for all the points 
in the given sample through the application of a Kalman filter. It is crucial to pay 
attention to the fact that in producing the afore-mentioned series only information 
available up to the period 1t  is utilised.  
 
3.2. A dynamic specification 
 
The evaluation of the data introduced in the previous section is based on the estimation 
of a general dynamic time series econometric model of the form 
 
.})(
)(])([{])([
0
2
*
11
12
1
01
tit
m
i
itiitttti
i
tttt
ee
pmmpmm







 
  
(3) 
 
Equation (3) is an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) specification of order 
twelve
12
, which assumes that the central bank does not react to contemporaneous 
economic developments, i.e. a dead-start (or structural) time series model (Hendry, 
Pagan, and Sargan, 1984).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
11
 It has to be pointed out that the CBDR has not historically made this type of forecasts 
publicly available in a timely and consistent fashion. 
12
 This account for the (probably) long lags involved (inertia) in the transmission of 
impulses from key economic variables to the monetary authorities’ policy instrument or 
indicator. 
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4.  Empirical analyses 
4.1.  1971.8-2000.12 
 
All the OLS regressions to be presented below start from a dynamic specification like 
(3), and are sequentially reduced using the criteria of a general to specific modelling 
approach (See Hendry, 1995). The results displayed are those corresponding to the final 
preferred equations. The corresponding initial general models are contained in Table 1. 
The inquiry begins with the estimation of (3) for the period 1971.8-2000.12. The results, 
reported in Table 1, fail a series of diagnostic statistics. The corresponding recursive 
graphical analyses, displayed in Figure 1, also hint at regime shifts in the sample period 
(See Doornik and Hendry, 2001, for details on these tests). A possible cause of the 
imprecision of the above mentioned estimates is that the period 1971.8-2000.12 
encompasses different monetary policy regimes. So, trying to fit a regression for the 
whole sample is not feasible.  
 10 
 
Figure 1 NFR general dynamic model recursive evaluation statistics, 1971.8-2000.12 
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One way to proceed is to identify the different monetary policy regimes 
encapsulated within the sample under study (e.g. Judd and Rudebusch, 1998). The most 
plausible way of doing so is by delimiting the economic and institutional events driving 
the data set under evaluation, to which end the behaviour of the variables involved in 
the study should provide useful insights.  
Figures 2 and 3 portray the joint graphs of m and 
1
)(


tt
pm , and of 
)( om ee  and  , respectively, for the full time span under consideration. At least four 
different regimes can be discerned by evaluating the Figures. 
1) 1971.7-1984.12: lapse of a fixed official exchange rate regime, which led to a 
series of agreements with the IMF in January 1983, September 1984, and 
January 1985. 
2) 1985.1-1988.6: period between the first devaluation of the official exchange rate 
in January 1985, its flotation, imposition of restrictions on the foreign exchange 
market by the CBDR, and subsequent re-fixing of the official rate in July 1988.  
3) 1988.7-1991.8: span comprising the re-fixing of the official exchange rate and 
the stabilisation agreement signed with the IMF in August 1991. 
4) 1991.9-2000.12: ranges from the 1991 agreement with the IMF to the year 2000 
(See Young, 2001, for details on various institutional changes that have taken 
place in the DR during this last period.). 
On the above sub-periods, it is also interesting to note that the transition pattern 
discerned from periods 1) to 2) to 3) is nicely described in Garber and Svensson (1995). 
Particularly, they outline the events that are usually observed before and after an 
exchange rate crisis. Quoting Garber and Svensson (1995, pages 1891-1892) in full "A 
salient feature of fixed exchange rate regimes is their inevitable collapse into some other 
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policy regime. The collapse is frequently spectacular - extraordinary large interventions 
into foreign exchange markets and losses by central banks… and a period of turbulent 
floating in a transition to the new regime." 
In what follows the strategy of the paper is to analyse individually these 
economically and institutionally determined regimes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 m and 
1
)(


tt
pm , 1970.6-2000.12 
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Figure 3  and )( om ee  , 1970.7-2000.12 
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Table 1 OLS estimations of general dynamic models for the NFRs for the Dominican Republic 
Coefficients 
Lags 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Model 1: 1971.7-2000.12 
  0.13** 0.26** 0.28** 0.21** 0.12* 0.13* 0.14* 0.03 -0.004 0.07 0.03 -0.47** 
1  
0.75** 0.97** 1.19** 0.91** 0.64** 0.61** 0.62** 0.34* 0.31* 0.10 0.12 -0.11 
2  
-0.005 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.003 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.001 0.020 
Model 2: 1971.8-1984.12 
  0.22** 0.18* 0.25** 0.13 -0.02 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.12 -0.54** 
1  
0.81** 0.87** 1.00** 0.61** 0.53** 0.51* 0.42* 0.33 0.32 0.13 0.20 -0.29* 
2  
-0.07 -0.002 0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.17 0.07 
Model 3: 1985.1-1988.6 
  1.04** -0.06 0.38 -0.45* - - - - - - - - 
1  
1.26** -1.04* 0.39 -0.58 - - - - - - - - 
2  
-0.05 0.01 -0.006 0.05 - - - - - - - - 
Model 4: 1988.7-1991.8 
  -0.19 0.12 0.47* 0.41 - - - - - - - - 
1  
-0.31 0.86 2.49* 1.25 - - - - - - - - 
2  
-0.98* 0.38 0.0004 0.40 - - - - - - - - 
Model 5: 1991.9-2000.12 
  0.37** 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.17 -0.05 -0.08 0.15 0.007 -0.05 0.04 -0.26** 
1  
0.66** 0.74** 0.38 0.94** 0.75** 0.04 0.42 0.43 0.18 -0.18 0.10 0.02 
2  
-0.11 0.13 0.12 -0.18 0.03 -0.31 0.73** -0.46 -0.08 0.08 0.16 0.13 
Model evaluation statistics 
Statistics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
( , )AR F    1.0313 2.1855* 0.4601 0.42254 0.6576 
( , )Arch F    24.316** 0.5500 0.3794 0.2078 0.3340 
2
)(Norm    
540.01** 4.9097 5.1064 6.3766 0.0306 
( , )RESET F    0.2844 4.3567* 2.7236 0.1243 3.582 
Notes on Table 1: (1) All the variables involved in the analysis are stationary. The corresponding ADF unit root test statistics are: 
1
( )
t t t
m m p

    = -3.971** (1971.8-2001.12); 
( )
m o
e e = -3.685** (1970.7-2000.12); ( *  ) = -8.861** (1971.9-2001.12), where ** denotes rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1% level. (2) Due to data limitations, for 
Models 3 and 4 the general modelling starts with four lags of each variable. (3) The model evaluation statistics are described in Table 2.  The values of the test statistics are displayed. (4) 
** and * denote significance of a coefficient/failure of a test at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. See Doornik and Hendry (2001) for further details on the test statistics. 
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4.2. 1971.7-1984.12 
 
The parsimonious equation for the first period is 
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Equation (4) displays adequate results. Statistically, all the diagnostic tests are passed 
(with the exception of the failure of the RESET  test). [Table 2 provides an explanation 
of the diagnostic statistics reported in (4) and the equations to follow.] Also, all the 
coefficients in (4) are significant. Hereafter * and ** indicate that a coefficient is 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2 Description of the model evaluation statistics 
 
Statistic Test description 
),(  FAR  Residual serial correlation. 
),(  FArch  Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. 
)(2  Norm  Normality. 
),(  FHet  Heteroscedasticity. 
),(  FHetFunc  Heteroscedasticity/functional form test. 
),(  FRESET  Ramsey’s functional form mis-specification test. 
),(  FLags  Tests the significance of all lags included in a given equation..  
)(2  Wald  Tests the null that the solved long-run coefficients of an 
equation are zero. 
Notes on Table 2: the null distribution of the tests is given by )(2  or ),( F , where the 
degrees of freedom are inside parentheses. Throughout the main text ** and * denote 
failure of a diagnostic statistic at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. See Doornik and 
Hendry (2001) for further details on these tests. 
 
 
 
Equation (4) is a nominal feedback rule (NFR) in which only the inflation gap 
matters to the monetary authorities, embodying a long-run inflation target 0 of 10% 
(the corresponding test on the validity of the solved long-run coefficients is 
]006.0*[*36.7)1(2 Wald ). Interestingly, such a NFR implies a lean with the wind 
policy was followed during the 1971 to 1984 period, i.e. a positive impact of an 
inflation gap on the intended inflation rate of the monetary authorities. While somewhat 
surprising, it is not an unreasonable reflection of developments in the DR.  
This period was characterised by several episodes. From 1970-1973 GDP grew 
at an average annual rate of 11.16%, mainly led by the government’s construction of 
physical infrastructure; and the economy was relatively stable, in part because of the 
favourable export commodity prices. Consequently, there was not much pressure on the 
exchange rate market. In contrast, the second part of the 1970s witnessed the world-
wide increases in oil prices, and not so favourable export prices. The satisfactory rate of 
 17 
GDP growth witnessed in the early 1970s could not be sustained in this new, adverse, 
environment. The government reacted by increasing public spending, financed by both 
external and domestic (mainly monetary) sources.  
By the early 1980s the adverse world financial conditions for indebted 
developing countries were imminent. Additionally, since the DR’s production is highly 
dependent on foreign inputs, the exchange rate regime that prevailed at the time could 
not survive very long. This situation was exacerbated by the huge gap that was allowed 
to develop between the market and official exchange rates in the period leading up to 
1985, as can be perceived by inspecting Figure 3, and which is also reflected in the 
absence (as dictated by the model reduction process) of )( om ee  from equation (4). 
This saga ended with the country having to sign three agreements with the IMF (in 
January 1983, September 1984, and January 1985), and with the first devaluation of the 
official exchange rate in January 1985 (See Coutts et al, 1986, for a detailed analysis of 
this period).  
 
4.3. 1985.1-1988.6 
 
In contrast to the rest of the monetary policy regimes investigated, the one 
corresponding to the 1985.1-1988.6 could a priori be expected to result in a NFR that 
does not allows for feedback from the exchange rate gap. The reason for this restriction 
is that the official exchange rate was flexible, virtually floating, during this period (see 
Figure 2). This policy change was mainly a by-product of a series of stabilisation 
agreements the DR signed with the IMF in January 1983, September 1984, and January 
1985, as noted above. 
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 The final estimated NFR for this regime is 
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Equation (5) passes a battery of diagnostic statistics. Additionally, the estimated 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The NFR for the post-1985 period is a 
compact one that allows for feedback from the inflation gap, and smoothing of the 
intended inflation rate. (5) implies that the reaction of the central bank’s authorit ies to a 
rise in the inflation gap is positive, albeit milder than for the regime analysed 
previously. During this period the government’s substantial construction programme 
was largely financed by the Central Bank.  
A further interesting point to note is that throughout 1985.1-1988.6 the CBDR 
had three different Governors (an average of 14 months in office for each Governor), a 
direct consequence of the government’s control of the institution. Cukierman (1992, 
Chapter 20) has investigated the importance of this institutional setting on central bank 
performance. Particularly, this author analyses the relationship between the governors' 
turnover rate and inflation. In Cukierman's inquiry the governors' turnover rate is one of 
the proxies used to capture the extent of central bank independence (CBI) in developing 
countries, since legal independence proved to be a bad measure of CBI. Cukierman 
finds that higher independence (i.e. a lower governor turnover rate) leads to lower 
inflation (See also Cukierman et al, 2002). Prima facie, the implicit turnover rates for 
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the DR (which is not included in Cukierman's sample) seem to be much higher than the 
average found in Cukierman's (1992) work. Notably, in a sample of over fifty developed 
and developing countries, Cukierman finds that the highest average turnover rate was 
that of Argentina, with an average tenure of fifteen months. 
Finally, the lack of an explicit reaction of the monetary authorities to 
)( om ee  in equation (5) is rationalised by the fact that during the span in question the 
CBDR tried to influence the behaviour of the foreign exchange rate market chiefly 
through foreign exchange rationing policies, rather than by actively attempting to 
manipulate (reduce) the amount of money in circulation. 
 
4.4.  1988.7-1991.8 
 
From June 1988 onward the official exchange rate was fixed again. The corresponding 
estimated NFR can be written as 
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All the diagnostics tests and coefficient values related to (6) are appropriate. Equation 
(6) suggests that the monetary authorities reacted positively to both the lagged 
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dependent variable and the inflation gap on a quarterly basis. Also, and in contrast to the 
regimes analysed up to now, the coefficient affecting the exchange rate differential is 
negative and significant, as could be expected.  
Figure 4 provides further evidence on the matter by displaying the recursively-
estimated coefficient of )( om ee  . Note that both the coefficient and error bands 
consistently lie in the negative region during most of the regime under scrutiny.  This 
outcome could be interpreted as evidence that the authorities manipulated its 
conjectured indicator variable in response to deviations of the parallel exchange rate 
from the official one. Given the instability in the exchange rate market during 1985.1-
1988.6, the evidence that the authorities allowed for feedback from )( om ee  in the 
subsequent period is economically compelling, notably as a signal of the CBDR’s 
willingness to consolidate its eroded reputation (e.g. Bertocchi and Spagat, 1993). 
Furthermore, note that the evidence on the reactions to the exchange rate 
variable in this regime is in harmony (in the sense that developments in the exchange 
rate market appear to have become more important) with the exchange rate regime 
classification for this period presented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). Specifically, for 
the exact period from February 1988 to August 1991 Reinhart and Rogoff classify, 
using a statistical procedure, the DR's exchange rate regime as free falling. Free falling 
is defined by the authors as a classification for countries that display a twelve-month 
rate of inflation of more than 40%. Remarkably, the DR experienced the highest 
inflation in its modern history during this period, as can be seen in Figure 3. 
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Figure 4 Recursive estimate of 2, t –1 2S.E.  for 1988.7-1991.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In spite of the above findings the 1988.7-1991.8 regime was problematical. The 
highest inflation rate in the history of the DR was registered in 1990 (See Figure 3), and 
a stand-by agreement with the IMF was approved in August 1991. A major private 
banking sector crisis at the end of the 1980s, the high oil prices of 1990 (mainly a result 
of the Gulf War), and recurrent government deficits are amongst the main causes of 
these events. The upshot of all these incidents is reflected in an estimated monthly (-
annualised) long-run inflation target 0 of roughly 25% for this period, the highest 
significantly estimated for any of the regime sub-samples. 
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4.5. 1991.9-2000.12 
 
The last period to be evaluated ranges from the 1991 macroeconomic stabilisation 
agreement with the IMF to the year 2000. The empirical assessment of a NFR like (3) 
for this interval leads to the following equation 
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All the tests applied to (7) are passed with ease. The regression equation displays a rich 
lag structure with declining coefficient weights affecting both ])([
1

ttt
pmm and 
)( *  , and a positive coefficient corresponding to the previous year’s exchange rate 
gap.  
There could be at least two, non-competing, economic interpretations for this 
exchange rate coefficient. It is well documented that the DR undertook major economic 
reforms and stabilisation policies starting in the 1990s, basically as a response to the 
misfortunes of the 1980s (See Young, 2001; Prazmowski, 2002). Amongst these 
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reforms there was a move to an implementation of monetary policy through more 
indirect instruments, namely via Certificates of Participation of the Central Bank of the 
Dominican Republic.  
Henceforth, the first explanation for the positive coefficient affecting the 
exchange rate gap could be that even though the monetary authorities might have 
reacted to adverse exchange rate developments, say by issuing Certificates of 
Participation, they were not successful in preventing a pass-through to internal prices. 
Also note that the coefficient in question is relatively low (0.26), supporting this 
rationalisation. In digesting this argument the reader should recall that the central bank 
can stir its indicator, but cannot perfectly control it. 
A second, non-competing, plausible explanation of the phenomena at hand could 
be the impact of the rate of the Certificates of Participation on the term structure of 
interest rates, and finally on inflationary expectations (See, for instance, the analysis of 
Tzavalis and Wickens, 1996, on forecasting inflation via the term structure). Note that a 
higher ( )m oe e , or higher depreciation expectations ( me ), triggers a response from the 
monetary authorities, which, during the 1990s, was in many cases translated into open 
market operations in the form of Certificates of Participation issued at attractive rates in 
relation to the prevailing market rates. The resulting higher interest rates are expected to 
curtail depreciation expectations (
me ), although probably only in the short run. It could 
be argued that these higher rates altered the term structure of the market rates and 
increased the inflationary expectations embodied in such a structure. The outcome of 
this process is reflected in the intended inflation measure contained in the NFR which, 
as noted above, can be stirred but not perfectly controlled by the monetary authorities.  
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The reader should bear in mind that the above arguments are not intended to 
furnish (by themselves) a rationalisation of the phenomena at hand, which could 
probably be illuminated by the consideration of alternative approaches in future studies. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper inquires into the historical behaviour of the Dominican Republic’s monetary 
authorities by employing a hypothetical nominal monetary policy feedback rule that 
incorporates an implicit inflation targeting mechanism, using a monthly data set ranging 
from 1969.6 to 2000.12. The results of the investigation suggest that the Central Bank 
of the Dominican Republic (CBDR) has, on average, pursued accommodative policies. 
This lean with the wind bias throughout the sample period investigated is particularly 
evident from the coefficients of the general models reported in Table 1. 
The outcome of the empirical exercises is sensible, notably given the degree of 
dependence the CBDR has historically had on the government’s requirements. 
Consequently, the fact that responses akin to those of an implicit inflation targeting 
regime cannot be consistently found should be considered in the light of the rules versus 
discretion debate (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), and of the copious literature on central 
bank (non) independence (e.g. Alesina and Summers, 1993). A signal of the relevance 
of such topics for the case at hand is the fact that the DR succeeded in dealing with the 
two most serious episodes of high inflation and unrest in the exchange rate market (both 
observed around 1985 and 1990) only by agreements with the IMF, i.e. through an 
externally imposed commitment. 
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